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Abstract
Who is wealthy? This paper presents empirical estimates of household move-
ments into and out of the top percents of the wealth distribution over indi-
vidual life cycles. There are life-cycle motives and precautionary motives
for wealth accumulation. The opportunities to accumulate wealth create in-
centives for education, work effort, and entrepreneurship. We would expect
considerable wealth mobility over the life cycle if the life-cycle motives and
incentives to accumulate are strong and affect behavior. The data are from
an administrative Swedish source that retains wealth information from tax
registers. The data are unique, they follow a large sample of households over
almost 40 years. There is substantial mobility when we follow individual
households over long enough time spans. We find that wealth mobility in-
creased until the end of the 1980s and then started to decrease. Age-wealth
probability profiles are consistent with life-cycle motives for wealth accumu-
lation. There are also limited precautionary motives for wealth accumulation
when households experience income uncertainty.
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1 Introduction
Personal wealth is highly concentrated both within countries and between countries
(Davies, 2008). Davies et al. (2008) reports that households in the top one percent
of the wealth distribution hold 33 percent of total private wealth in the United
States. Corresponding figures are 35 percent for Switzerland, 29 percent for Den-
mark, 23 percent for the United Kingdom, and 21 percent for France. Ohlsson et al.
(2008) reports a top one percent share of total wealth of 18 percent in Sweden.
Who is wealthy? Is being wealthy temporary or permanent? People accumu-
late wealth during their working lives for consumption during retirement. This
is the traditional life-cycle motive for savings in the tradition of Modigliani and
Brumberg (1954). Those who save accumulate wealth with age in an absolute
sense. They also move through the wealth distribution and improve their position
in the wealth ranking. How important are life-cycle motives driven by consump-
tions smoothing for wealth accumulation? There are also precautionary motives for
wealth accumulation (Leland, 1968). How important are precautionary motives?
The opportunities to accumulate wealth, in turn, create incentives for educa-
tion, work effort, and entrepreneurship. We would expect considerable wealth mo-
bility over the life cycle if the life-cycle motives and incentives to accumulate are
strong and affect behavior. But to what extent is there equality of opportunity
within a cohort?
The degree of intragenerational wealth mobility is important when discussing
different economic issues. First, wealth accumulation is the result of choices con-
cerning labor supply, consumption, and savings. Life-cycle models predict that
individuals will accumulate wealth while working and then decumulate when re-
tired. One set of issues concern how well the life-cycle model predicts the actual
age-wealth profiles and if these profiles differ between individuals. Another issue
is if controlling for other determinants of wealth reduces the observed differences
in age-wealth profiles. While we can, in principle, control for education, other
important determinants of wealth accumulation such as entrepreneurial ability, are
inherently unobservable.
Second, wealth mobility reflects the extent to which there is equality of op-
portunity in a society. If there is complete equality of opportunity, the wealth of
a young person will not be a good predictor of this person’s wealth when mid-
dle aged. Suppose that entrepreneurship and risk taking sometimes for some yield
considerable wealth increases. If wealth taxation reduces entrepreneurship and
risk taking, we would then expect reduced wealth mobility. Wealth during differ-
ent phases of the life cycle will be highly correlated if, on the other hand, inherited
wealth is important. Inheritances are, however, very unequally distributed.
We study the mobility of individuals and households in the wealth distribution
as they age and, therefore, over time. A related objective is to study other de-
terminants of being wealthy. We expect considerable differences in the life-cycle
patterns of wealth as people differ in many respects. The focus is on mobility
between two possible states: being wealthy and not being wealthy. This is the im-
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portant extensive margin to study for macroeconomic aggregates and from a public
finance perspective.
The longitudinal micro data set we use in this paper is drawn from public reg-
isters. It spans close to four decades. This is a feature that, to our knowledge,
is unique in the world. The data allow us to track individual households’ wealth
transitions on a year-by-year basis.
The administrative nature of our panel data implies that we do not face any of
the problems surveys do. This is the particular strength. Our data base, however,
only captures the households that pay wealth taxes. This limits the analysis we can
provide. We can, however, study the important top of the wealth distribution.
We can assess wealth mobility over the entire life cycle. This helps overcom-
ing an important drawback of earlier studies of intragenerational wealth mobility.
Shorrocks (1978a) shows that measured mobility, and its links with a distributional
assessment of inequality, directly depends on the length of the observation window.
1.1 Previous literature on intragenerational wealth mobility
The previous literature on intragenerational wealth mobility includes Hurst et al.
(1998), Jianakoplos and Menchik (1997), Keister (2005), and Steckel and Krishnan
(2006) who all study wealth mobility in the United States. Jappelli and Pistaferri
(2000) study wealth mobility in Italy. Klevmarken et al. (2003) and Klevmarken
(2004) are among the previous papers on wealth mobility in Sweden.
These studies are based on wealth observations, in the time dimension, for
2–4 years. Wealth mobility is studied by comparing individual households’ posi-
tions in the wealth distribution, in most cases, 5–7 years apart. Sometimes the time
span is down to 2 years, sometimes up to 10–15 years apart. The sample sizes are
quite small, in the cross-section dimension there are observations for 1,000–5,000
households. Wealth mobility is defined as movements between quartiles, quintiles,
or deciles in the wealth distribution.
Most studies find that the probabilities to stay poor or to remain wealthy are
comparatively high. Wealth mobility is predominantly high in the middle of the
wealth distribution. The previous literature consists of single country studies.
Klevmarken et al. (2003) is the only exception, it compares wealth mobility in
the United States and Sweden. Contrary to what many might have conjectured,
Klevmarken et al. (2003) find that wealth mobility in Sweden is as high as in the
US.
Quadrini (2000) differs from other studies by separating the wealth mobility
of business owners (self-employed) from that of other households. He finds that
households owning businesses are more likely to move upwards in the wealth dis-
tribution than other households. The entrepreneurial households, in this sense,
show more upward wealth mobility.
The previous literature is, however, limited by the small number of observa-
tions. In the time dimension, the few observations for specific individuals for dif-
ferent years can only account for very limited parts of the individual’s life cycle. In
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the cross section dimension, the few observations of different individuals for spe-
cific years mean that observations can only be grouped into a few quantiles. This
means that the measure of mobility becomes imprecise when mobility is defined as
movements between quantiles. These limitations also reduce the possible choices
of empirical methods to study mobility. In addition, the previous literature is based
on survey data. Surveys tend not to do so well in covering the top percents of the
wealth distribution.
1.2 Our contribution
We believe that we can deal with these shortcomings of the previous mobility lit-
erature. The data available to us are from the LINDA data base, an administrative
source from Statistics Sweden. This data base provides long individual time se-
ries, many individuals, and the top percents of the wealth distribution are well
documented. This enables us to improve considerably on the analysis of wealth
mobility.
The LINDA data base sampled slightly more than 3 percent of the Swedish
population and also includes the household members of the sampled individuals.
There are 300,000 households and 700,000 individuals in this data base. We can
follow a considerable part of individual life cycles for many. There are close to
40 annual observations for some individuals.
The key variables we use are derived from annual taxable net wealth at the
individual level and at the household level from 1968 to 2005.1 The wealth tax was
repealed from 2007. A main advantage with this data set is that for those who did
pay wealth taxes there are very precise wealth measurements based on third party
reporting available. A disadvantage is that wealth information in the register data
is only available for those whose taxable wealth exceeded the high tax exemption
levels. The Tax Agency was only allowed to keep the wealth data for those who
paid the tax. This means that our measure of wealth mobility is very closely related
to whether or not the individual pays wealth taxes.
Wealth mobility is interpreted as the movements in and out of the top percents
of the wealth distribution over time and, also, movements over time within the top
percents.2 We also use an absolute real wealth measure, movements across a real
wealth threshold. Macroeconomic shocks and general changes in asset prices can
be expected to affect absolute wealth but not necessarily relative wealth.
1Taxable wealth at the household level was also the actual wealth tax base during the studied
period.
2The paper is, therefore, related to the top wealth literature. Roine and Waldenstro¨m (2009) is a
recent contribution on top wealth in Sweden. Some other studies in this literature are Kopczuk and
Saez (2004) for the United States, Piketty et al. (2006) for France, Dell et al. (2007) for Switzerland,
and Ohlsson et al. (2008) for Denmark and Norway. While some of those papers rely on joining
distributional statistics from a multitude of sources over time, we have a single comprehensive source
of micro data at our disposal. We can, therefore, allow for considerable degrees of heterogeneity
when assessing how households move through the distribution over time.
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We start with a descriptive analysis based on the transition patterns that we
observe in the data. There are considerable movements into and within the top
percents in the wealth distribution. This is not quite consistent with previous results
for Sweden presented by Klevmarken (2004). He, however, studies other segments
of the wealth distribution than we do. The average duration of being wealthy is
about 6 years conditional on ever being wealthy.
Intragenerational wealth mobility has changed considerably over the last four
decades. Mobility increased during the 1970s and 1980s. The peak in mobility
coincides with the deregulation of the Swedish financial markets during the sec-
ond half of the 1980s. Wealth mobility has decreased since then. The number of
wealthy and the concentration of wealth have increased at the same time.
We provide an in-depth analysis of the likelihood of individual households
being wealthy in the estimation part of the paper.3 We do not only account for
time effects explicitly, but also control for age and other life cycle-related vari-
ables. Among those, hump-shaped age patterns are clearly borne out, with peaks
around the standard age of retirement, giving rise to broadly support life cycle con-
sumption smoothing motives. Family-size related demographics are typically not
among the main drivers of observed patterns. Household-level heterogeneity in
total, however, both observed and unobserved, delivers the largest contribution to
explaining the observed variation in the sample. The probability of being wealthy
is higher when households experience high income uncertainty. This is consis-
tent with precautionary motives for savings and wealth accumulation. The overall
effect is small, however.
An important aspect of this paper’s use of the data is that we can control for
unobserved heterogeneity not only through a random effects approach, but also
directly by way of including individual-specific dummy variables. We, therefore,
do not need to rely on conditioning out the heterogeneity terms, instead we can
estimate them directly at the individual level. This is possible as we have access to
such uniquely long individual time-series. Accounting for such detail on individual
differences has, to our knowledge, not been done and not been possible before in
this context.4
The estimated heterogeneity terms are positively correlated with being wealthy.
They are also correlated in intuitive ways with a range of observable household-
level characteristics. We, for example, include a regressor for ever reporting self-
employment income (or profits and losses) which we observe for some part of
our sample period. Personal wealth and self-employment are strongly positively
correlated. This observation is consistent with returns to entrepreneurial abilities
and risk taking but possibly also with liquidity constraints.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents our theoretical
framework. We present the data source, the data set, and the variables we use in
3Transition models for becoming wealthy, however, tell much of a similar story.
4In a companion paper, Hochguertel and Ohlsson (2011), we study heterogeneous wealth profiles
over individual life cycles, but focus on a particular sub-sample.
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Section 3. Section 4 reports descriptive results on wealth mobility. The estimation
results are reported in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical framework
The objective of this section is to discuss the implications for wealth accumulation
of the choices that the individual makes concerning consumption and savings.5
The approach is to start by focusing on the modeling assumptions needed to have
individuals making the same choices rather than different choices.
The homogenous case - age effects only. Suppose that there is no uncertainty.
Individuals have the same length of life and no bequest motives. They meet the
same constant rate of interest. Each household consists of a single individual.
Utility is additively separable, the instantaneous utility function does not change
over time, and the time preference is constant.
The individual chooses a consumption path Ct , t = 1, . . . ,T ∗ such as to maxi-
mize life time utility U ,
U =
T ∗
∑
t=1
u(Ct)
(1+ρ)t−1
, (1)
subject to an intertemporal budget constraint of the form
T ∗
∑
t=1
Ct
(1+ r)t−1
=
R
∑
t=1
Et
(1+ r)t−1
+W0. (2)
Here, u is instantaneous utility with decreasing marginal utility, t is time, T ∗ is the
length of life, ρ is the time preference rate, r denotes the rate of interest, R is the
retirement age, E is earnings, and W0 is the value of initial wealth in the beginning
of period 1. The left hand side of equation (2) is lifetime consumption CL, the right
hand side lifetime resources consisting of lifetime earnings EL and initial wealth.
Provided that R < T ∗, there will be retirement saving so that the individual can
consume when retired. Consumption will be smoothed over the life cycle.
Let us add the following assumptions: Suppose that the interest rate and the
time preference rate are zero, that initial wealth is zero, and that annual earnings
are constant during the individual’s working life. The individual will choose to con-
sume a fixed share of lifetime earnings every year. This will result in a piecewise
linear age-wealth profile with increasing wealth until retirement, a wealth peak
at retirement, and then decreasing wealth. Wealth W of individual i will evolve
according to
Wit =Wit−1+(1−DRi )
(
1
Ri
− 1
T ∗i
)
ELi −DRi
1
T ∗i
ELi , (3)
5The discussion is inspired by Davies and Shorrocks (1999) and Dynan et al. (2004).
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where DRi is an indicator equal to one when individual i is retired and zero other-
wise. The savings rate of a working individual is
sit ≡ Wit −Wit−1ELi
=
1
Ri
− 1
T ∗i
. (4)
Suppose that individuals are identical except for age. During their working life
individuals will move up in the wealth distribution both in absolute and relative
sense, as retired individuals will move down.
The heterogenous case. It is an old question in the economics literature whether
wealthy people save more than people who are not wealthy. Dynan et al. (2004)
discuss under which conditions savings rates are the same. Savings rates provide a
link between income and wealth. Suppose that individuals have different lifetime
earnings while there is no uncertainty and there are no bequest motives. With
identical savings rates for a cohort j, the wealth of an individual belonging to the
cohort will evolve according to
Wi jt =Wi jt−1+ s jtELi j. (5)
The cohort specific savings rate is s jt . Consumption is proportional to lifetime
earnings for the individual either if (i) the time preference rate is constant and
equals the rate of interest or if (ii) preferences are homothetic. In the first case an-
nual consumption will be the same every year, in the second case annual consump-
tion will grow at the same rate every year. In addition, suppose that preferences,
length of life, and rates of interest are the same for all individuals. The ratio of
consumption to lifetime earnings at time t is the same for all individuals belonging
to cohort j. Finally, suppose that the relative differences between individuals in
annual earnings are constant over time. The savings rate at time t will then, with
these assumptions, be the same for all individuals belonging to cohort j. There
will, in other words, be no cross section variation at time t for those of the same
age. The savings rate might, on the other hand, vary over time (age) for a given co-
hort. During their working life individuals will move up in the wealth distribution
both in absolute and relative sense. Those with higher lifetime earnings will move
faster and end up with more wealth at retirement than those with lower lifetime
earnings.
Relaxing any of these assumptions and instead introducing, for example, differ-
ences in preferences or earnings profiles, rates of interest, length of life, retirement
age, or introducing uncertainty, bequest motives, and liquidity constraints will re-
sult in less homogeneity across individuals in wealth accumulation.
3 Data
Our data are from the Longitudinal INdividual DAta base (LINDA), a data source
collected and maintained by Statistics Sweden.6 The source data are various ad-
6Edin and Fredriksson (2000) presents the data base.
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ministrative data bases from government agencies that keep records on any (reg-
istered) inhabitant in the country. For instance, data from the tax authorities, the
social security administration, and from local municipalities. We have spent con-
siderable effort to get at coherent definitions of variables from an array of different
variables for different years in the source data.
3.1 The samples
The data come in two sub-samples, that we refer to as the P-sample (the panel
sample) and the F-sample (the family sample). For the P-sample, the data were
randomly drawn in 1994 with a sample size of 300,000 households, comprising
almost 700,000 individuals. This sample is available from 1968 to 1999. A house-
hold in the data set is a group of people treated as a taxable unit. For the vast
majority of cases, this coincides with a residential household or a family.
The F-sample is available to us from 1991 until 2005. Hence, there is an over-
lap of 1991–1999, where both samples are available. In the F-sample, the sampling
unit is a “family”, that is, persons living at the same address according to the pop-
ulation register. Since there may be several sub-households within a “family” that
are treated as separate taxable units, and since members of the same tax households
may live at different addresses, it is possible that the definitions of “households” in
the P-sample and of “family” in the F-sample do not coincide. A “family” is, on
average, slightly larger than a “household”.
We can, however, link both P- and F-samples over time through the identity of
the sampled index person. Appendix A provides some more details on the proce-
dure.
The administrative nature of the data implies that there is no panel data attrition
as is known from survey data. Theoretically, a person can leave the sample by
emigration or death (and only in a few cases where records could not be traced in
the source data bases). Persons enter by birth or by, say, marrying into an existing
unit.
3.2 The wealth variable
The dependent variables we use are derived from annual taxable net wealth at the
household level. We will present some main facts about the Swedish wealth tax in
this Subsection. Appendix B reports more details.
The wealth tax base was a comprehensive measure of household net wealth (in-
cluding real assets and financial assets minus debts). Taxable wealth did, however,
not include pension wealth in the sense that the value of future public and occu-
pational pensions were not included; neither were savings in tax deferred pension
savings accounts. Wealth taxation was affected by tax evasion and tax avoidance.
Tax compliance was, however, high for assets for which there was third party re-
porting. The Tax Agency was by law required to only keep the wealth information
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Figure 1: Shares paying wealth tax and being “millionaires”, 1968–2005, percent
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for those having to pay the wealth tax. This severely limits the observability of
wealth in the data.
We, therefore, do not use the wealth amounts directly. Instead we use qualita-
tive information on whether the household paid the wealth tax or was wealthy in
an absolute or relative sense.
Figure 1 shows the percentage share of wealth tax paying households in Swe-
den 1968–2005, see the top solid line in the figure. It is clear that we have in-
formation for the five top percent for most years, but complete data for the whole
period are only available for the top three percent. The design of the system for
taxing wealth has varied during the period, for instance concerning tax rates and
exemption levels. Many more households paid wealth taxes during the 1980s and
the second half of the 1990s. Almost 12 percent of the households paid the wealth
tax at least once during the period. More than a third of the households that we can
continuously observe 1968–2005 paid wealth taxes some time during the period.7
Paying wealth tax or not is one of the possible distinctions between states that
can be made for these data. We are, however, here more interested in the percentiles
of the wealth distribution. There is only complete information over time for the top
three percent of the cross-sectional wealth distribution. We will use the distinction
between belonging to the top three percent or not. We can also study the flows in to
and out the top three percent (across the 97th percentile, P97) and the flows within
the top three percent (across P98 and P99). Almost 6 percent of the households
belonged to the top three percent at least once during the period. Slightly more
7Table B.2 in Appendix B presents data on average wealth amounts 1968–2005 for the different
classifications we use for who is wealthy.
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than 17 percent of the households that we can continuously observe during 1968–
2005 belonged to the top three percent of the cross sectional wealth distribution for
at least one year during the period. These patterns suggest that life-cycle effects
have a considerable role.
We can also compute an absolute real measure instead of this relative measure.
This will give a related but different distinction. The highest real exemption level,
defined as the nominal exemption level in relation to nominal GDP per capita,
during the period was the one in 1970. The real value was ≈ SEK2010 1.5 million.
This corresponds to EUR2010 160,000 and USD2010 210,000.
We have information on all fortunes above this real wealth threshold during
the whole period. We will use the metaphor millionaires to refer to the households
above this threshold. Slightly more than 6 percent of the households was a “mil-
lionaire” at least once during the period. Almost 18 percent of the households that
we can continuously observe 1968–2005 was a “millionaire” some time during the
period.
Figure 1 also shows how the share of “millionaires” has evolved during the
period. The share of households above the real wealth threshold that we have im-
posed shows a decreasing trend until 1980. Since then the trend has been reversed,
an increasing share of the households is above the real wealth threshold.
There are three types of changes in the wealth tax design that have affected
assessed wealth considerably:
a. Major reassessments of single family houses’ tax values is the first type of
change. House prices increased continuously while these assessments were
not made every year. This meant that the assessed values increased consid-
erably when the assessments were made. Political pressure often resulted in
politicians responding by increasing the wealth tax exemption levels. There
were major reassessments in 1970, 1975, 1981, 1990, 1996, and 2001.
b. Changes in the fraction of wealth in small businesses (working capital) that
was tax exempted is the second type of change. All small business wealth
was included in the tax base in the beginning of the studied period. Strong
pressure groups succeeded in step by step increasing the fraction that was
wealth tax exempt. Small business wealth was completely exempt from
wealth taxation from 1991. Before this, reductions were made in 1970, 1974,
and 1978.
c. The number of household members did not matter for wealth taxation until
2001, only total household wealth mattered. Couples got a higher exemption
than singles from 2001. The difference in exemption increased considerably
in 2005. Many couples no longer had to pay the wealth tax as their exemption
increased, whereas singles with the same wealth still had to pay the tax.
Increases in this exemption difference, therefore, decreased the proportion
of couples in our sample.
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3.3 The control variables
The set of control variables we have at our disposal from LINDA is quite limited,
but we do have important demographics for the household index person: The time
invariant variables are year of birth, place of birth, gender, and education.8 We
also observe the marital status of the household index person (time varying). We
know the household size, the number of children and their ages (time varying).9
The employment income of the household is also known to us.10 The correspond-
ingly long series on incomes also allow us to construct measures of permanent
(time constant) and transitory (time varying) income variances. We include these
variables as additional regressors to estimate precautionary savings responses to
income uncertainty. Appendix A.3 provides the details of these measures that rely
on within-household variation of income.
It is unfortunately not possible to identify all individuals who are entrepreneurs
and self-employed. There is information on business income for some self-employ-
ed from 1991 on. Most of these self-employed run businesses that are not incorpo-
rated. It is, however, not possible to throughout the studied period identify owners
of incorporated firms who report employment income rather than business income.
We include a number of time-varying variables to correct for specific changes
over time: real GDP growth, the change of a stock market index, and the changes
in regional house price indices.11
Finally, we include some aspects of the design of the wealth tax: the lowest
and the highest marginal wealth tax rates, the exemption levels for singles and
couples in real value, the changes in the regional tax assessed values of single
family houses, and the fraction of working capital in small businesses that was
exempt from taxation.
4 Descriptive results on wealth mobility
4.1 Wealth flows and wealth durations
Table 1 reports transitions during the period 1968–2005. The left hand panel shows
flows into and out of the top three percent of the distribution. The right hand
panel reports transitions crossing the real wealth threshold from below (inflow) and
8Education, measured as the highest level obtained, is not strictly time-constant for everyone, but
we treat it as such.
9We control in regressions for number and age composition of children to capture the fact that
larger households may be wealthier because they have more members. This is an alternative, and
possibly less controversial approach, to equalize wealth across different demographic household
types.
10Employment income includes salaries and, since 1974, social insurance system benefits (such
as sickness benefits and parental benefits), and unemployment benefits. Approved costs for com-
muting to work are subtracted. Employment income also includes public pensions and occupational
pensions.
11Note that regional house price indices vary over both time and regions.
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transitions in the reverse direction (outflow). From now on, we study transitions
between two discrete states: being in the top three percent (state 1), and not being
in the top three percent (state 0). Alternatively, we consider being or not being a
“millionaire”.
There is some variation over time in the inflow rates to the top three percent.
This might be attributable to macroeconomic shocks and asset price changes, for
instance. Most years the inflow rate is around 0.5 percent while outflow rates are
in the range 15–20 percent. Obviously, inflow and outflow rates are by definition
highly correlated in this case as the share is fixed to three percent. The years in
which the major changes in the wealth tax design occurred are in bold. Flows are,
in general, higher than otherwise these years.
Mobility is closely related to duration, high mobility implies short duration.
The average outflow rate from the top three percent of 16.64 suggests an average
duration in the top three percent of 6.01 years. Average duration is often referred
to as mean exit time (MET) in the mobility literature. The average outflow and
inflow rates together suggest a top three equilibrium share of 3.54 percent. These
flow rates, therefore, are not at a long run equilibrium.
Turning to the second distinction, there is more variation in the inflow into
being a “millionaire” than the inflow to the top three percent. This inflow rate is in
the range 0.2–1.5 percent while the outflow rate is in the range 10–30 percent.
The average outflow rate from being a “millionaire” of 18.05 suggests an aver-
age duration as “millionaire” of 5.54 years. The average outflow and inflow rates
together imply a long run “millionaire” share of 3.22 percent. The actual average
“millionaire” share is about the same. Flows are also in this case, in general, higher
than otherwise these years.
Starting from a life-cycle model perspective, we would expect it to be more
likely to observe people above the cutoffs when they are in their 50s and 60s and
until they retire. Transitions into the top three percent or into becoming a “million-
aire” would then be more likely when people accumulate wealth, while transitions
in the other direction would be more likely when people have retired.
While Table 1 is illustrative on average transition probabilities it masks differ-
ences in wealth transitions. Our data give long uninterrupted accounts of wealth
status. There are 673,912 households for which we at least have non-missing ob-
servations for at least two adjacent years. Of these, 93.7 percent were never in the
top three percent, while 5.8 percent were in the top three percent some of the years
observed but not all. A small fraction of the households, 0.6 percent, were in the
top three percent in every year.
Figure 2 shows the frequency distribution of the time spells when belonging
to the top three percent. Most spells are short, half of the spells are shorter than
3 years. The number of longer top three percent spells is very low.
We can also calculate the total number of years in the top three percent. House-
holds always in the top three percent have a fraction of 13.45 percent of the total
number of top three years. The rest of the top three years, 86.55 percent, are for
households sometimes in the top three percent. We know that a household in this
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Table 1: Transitions over time, 1968–2005
the top three percent “millionaire”
between inflow, percent outflow, percent inflow, percent outflow, percent
annual 0.61 16.64 0.60 18.05
1968–2005
1968–1969 0.49 11.09 0.51 14.65
1969–1970 0.83a 13.89b 1.22a 12.82b
1970–1971 0.30 16.72 0.56 12.19
1971–1972 0.37 9.06 0.38 13.63
1972–1973 0.40 9.92 0.32 15.67
1973–1974 0.49 12.80b 0.23 24.30b
1974–1975 0.70a 18.89 1.09a 10.93
1975–1976 0.46 11.45 0.25 22.43
1976–1977 0.48 12.44 0.24 20.10
1977–1978 0.87 25.25b 0.22 40.21b
1978–1979 0.58 15.60 0.16 27.18
1979–1980 0.59 15.79 0.18 23.80
1980–1981 1.06a 31.16 1.97a 6.72
1981–1982 0.54 14.58 0.40 19.19
1982–1983 0.55 15.27 0.36 21.35
1983–1984 0.53 13.44 0.17 29.29
1984–1985 0.53 13.33 0.32 15.15
1985–1986 0.61 16.54 0.51 12.93
1986–1987 0.66 18.39 0.20 33.77
1987–1988 0.66 18.21 0.50 15.70
1988–1989 0.60 16.28 0.34 19.10
1989–1990 0.99a 29.03 0.83a 20.23
1990–1991 0.58 25.54b 0.51 22.06b
1991–1992 0.66 18.34 0.71 15.32
1992–1993 0.57 15.21 0.96 8.29
1993–1994 0.78 20.74 0.43 28.85
1994–1995 0.51 14.04 0.42 15.27
1995–1996 0.64a 16.80 1.45a 7.15
1996–1997 0.55 14.87 0.70 15.14
1997–1998 0.42 11.47 0.53 11.05
1998–1999 0.57 15.33 1.19 7.76
1999–2000 0.47 11.87 0.35 19.69
2000–2001 0.63a 18.40c 1.14a 11.94c
2001–2002 0.64 17.97 0.55 22.16
2002–2003 0.50 13.99 0.86 10.85
2003–2004 0.42 11.10 0.52 11.34
2004–2005 0.83 24.70c 0.31 37.99c
Notes: a major reassessment of single family houses’ tax values,
b major reduction of small businesses’ wealth tax values,
c major increase in the difference in exemption between couples and singles.
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Figure 2: Frequency distribution of top three percent spells, percent
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Figure 3: Frequency distribution of top three percent years, percent
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group at least once enters or leaves the top three percent.
Figure 3 reports the frequency distribution of top three percent years for differ-
ent top three percent spell lengths. Almost half the top three percent years are for
households with top three percent spell lengths shorter than eight years. It is also
clear from the figure that the contributions of always top three percent households
are very small. The exception is for the top three percent spell length of 38 years
where all households by definition always are wealthy.
4.2 Wealth mobility and wealth stability
An often used summary measure in the previous literature on wealth mobility is
the Shorrocks measure of mobility, see Shorrocks (1978b).12 It is defined as
S =
N− tr(P)
N−1 (6)
where N is the number of groups and tr(P) is the trace of the N ×N transition
matrix P. The range of S is [0,N/(N−1)]. A higher S indicates a higher degree of
mobility.
In our case, we select to study four groups, each of the three top percents and
those below P97 taken together. Using the average transitions rates of our data, the
Shorrocks’ measure is 0.386. This cannot, however, be compared to previous mea-
sures of wealth mobility in Sweden as we here only measure mobility for the top
three percents. The strength of our data is many observations for each household.
We can, therefore, calculate a time series for annual wealth mobility for almost
40 years using the Shorrocks’ measure.
Figure 4 shows how wealth mobility has evolved during the studied period. The
annual Shorrocks’ measures vary considerably. The huge spikes in the Shorrocks’
measures coincide with the major changes in the wealth tax design, compare Ta-
ble 1. Household differences in portfolio composition and marital status might
change the assessed household wealth ranking when such major changes occur. It
is, however, possible that there are no corresponding changes in the true underlying
household wealth ranking.
We have estimated a descriptive regression controlling for the major changes
in the wealth tax design.13 We also include trend polynomials as regressors. The
trend polynomials’ estimated coefficients are statistically significant at the 1 per-
cent level. The estimated trend line in the figure suggests that wealth mobility
increased during the 1970s and 1980s. The peak in mobility coincides with the
deregulation of the Swedish financial markets during the second half of the 1980s.
Wealth mobility has decreased since then. Roine and Waldenstro¨m (2009) show
that the concentration of wealth in Sweden also started to increase 1985.
Wealth stability can be measured as the share of households in the top three
percent, respectively, that have stayed in between the percentiles where they were
12Some refer to the measure as Shorrocks’ MET as it is a function of mean exit time from a group.
13Table A.1, column 1, in Appendix A reports the results.
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Figure 4: Wealth mobility, 1969–2005, Shorrocks’ measure
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Figure 5: Wealth stability, 1969–2005, adjusted series, percent
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in the previous year. We have estimated descriptive regressions with the three
wealth stability measure as dependent variables. We include trend polynomials
as regressors and control for the three major changes in the wealth tax design.14
Figure 5 shows the wealth stability series adjusted for the estimated effects of the
major wealth tax changes.
About 80–90 percent of the households in the top percent remained there the
following year. The corresponding number for the next percent is lower. About
60–70 percent of the households between P98 and P99 remained there the follow-
ing year. Stability is even lower if we turn to the next percent. The share remaining
is 50–60 percent for the households between P97 and P98.
The trend polynomials’ estimated coefficients are statistically significant at the
1 percent level. The estimated trend lines confirm the findings in Figure 4. Wealth
stability decreased during the 1970s and 1980s. From the end of the 1980s wealth
stability has increased.
It is also clear from Figure 5 that deviations from the trend line are smaller for
the top percent than for households between P98 and P99. These deviations are, in
turn, smaller than the deviations for households between P97 and P98.15
These descriptives tell a story about the movements in the top percents of the
Swedish wealth distribution during the period 1968–2005. But we have far from
used all the possibilities that our panel data offer. This will be the objective of the
following section.
5 Estimation results
This section reports estimations of probability models for being a “millionaire” and
belonging to the top three percent.16 We start by presenting our approach to esti-
mation in Subsection 5.1. The estimation results when we include all households
in the samples are in Subsection 5.2. It is, however, not clear-cut how to separate
age effects from cohort effects. We, therefore, also report estimation results when
the sample only includes households with an index person born 1940–1950.
We then condition the samples to households that ever have been “millionaires”
or in the top three percent. The estimation results for all households in these cat-
egories are in Subsection 5.3. We, finally, restrict the conditional samples to only
include households with an index person born 1940–1950. The estimation results
are in Subsection 5.4.
14Table A.1, columns 2–4, in Appendix A reports the results.
15See RMSE in Table A.1, columns 2–4, in Appendix A.
16We have also estimated transition models that condition the sample on “not being wealthy”
(either way) in the previous year. Given the sample distributions of the dependent variables, the
resulting models yield estimates (available on request from the authors) that convey a largely similar
story as those displayed here.
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5.1 Estimation approach
We choose to include time-varying variables directly instead of including time in-
dicators. Time-varying variables can be interpreted to measure the specific impact
of certain macroeconomic events and tax changes.
We include age as a third-degree polynomial and we control for cohort effects.
We do this by way of year of birth dummies (random effects approach), or by
way of individual fixed effects. We have alternatively considered the approach
advocated by Deaton and Paxson (1994). In that paper a full set of age dummies
is included along with a full set of time dummies. The latter are restricted to sum
to zero and to be orthogonal to a time trend. This alternative normalization will
pull up the time patterns estimated in the data, as without the restriction we would
find a decreasing trend over time. Age effects are shifted downwards, accordingly,
but much in a parallel fashion. Importantly, none of the included demographics
coefficients is affected.
We choose to lag some of the control variables by one year. The variables are
household employment income, marginal wealth tax rates, and the real wealth tax
exemption level.17
The estimated models are of four types: The initial sample includes all house-
holds with at least two adjacent observations. The first set of estimations is random
effects probit models for belonging to the top three percent and being a “million-
aire”. We condition on time averages of regressors as additional covariates. 18
Mundlak (1978) has shown the equivalence of random and fixed effects linear mod-
els when this conditioning is done in random effects models. Our application to
nonlinear models is heuristic. Actual fixed effects approaches are consistent as the
unobserved fixed effects can be freely correlated with the included time-varying
regressors.
The models in the first set are important as they let us estimate the probability
that someone is wealthy. The sample includes everyone and is not selected in any
way. We draw a 10 percent random sub-sample since the data set is too big to
handle with our computer.
The second set of estimations uses a sample only including households with
an index person born 1940–1950. We estimate random effects probit models for
belonging to the top three percent and being a “millionaire” also for this sample.
We then proceed and condition the samples to households that have been “mil-
lionaires” or in the top three percent at least once. This makes it possible for us to
estimate fixed effects models. Fixed effects models are more flexible as all time-
constant unobservables are essentially captured by the fixed effect and arbitrary
correlation with the included observables is possible. Fixed effects may also suf-
17Note that we include annual system parameters and not (endogenous) actual tax rates paid by in-
dividual households. Yet, there may be aggregate feedback effects from including contemporaneous
values. Lagged household income is meant to be predetermined.
18The only exception is that we do not include the time-average of the transitory variance of
income uncertainty, which is highly correlated with the permanent variance.
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fer less from differential mortality bias (Shorrocks, 1975; Attanasio and Hoynes,
2000) as they condition on the identity of the individual household. This is an
important selection issue.
If we want to calculate marginal effects, we need to have an estimate of the
fixed effect at the individual level. We, therefore, need to include dummy variables.
To have this consistent, however, we need to condition on a long panel (30 and more
time observations). We follow Greene (2004) and program a routine that allows
inclusion of literally thousands of dummy variables in estimation without having
to handle (compute, store, invert) associated large sparse matrices. This way we
can recover the fixed effects as estimated parameters and study the correlation with
observables. This cannot be done if we use random effects probit or fixed effects
logit.
The third set of estimations is fixed effects probit models and random effects
probit models with Mundlak-corrections for belonging to the top three percent and
being a “millionaire”. The samples used include all households with 30 or more
observations that have ever belonged to the top three percent or been “million-
aire”.19 We report marginal effects and predicted probabilities. The fourth set
of estimations repeats all this restricting the samples to households with an index
person born 1940–1950.
Using the conditional samples to estimate a fixed effects probit models has a
remaining double selection issue: (i) it conditions on those that become wealthy
(as a conditional logit also would do), (ii) among those, it selects those that stay
long in the sample. There is no self-selection as we use register data, but there is
selection on year of birth as old and young cohorts are removed by the requirement
of 30 or more observations.
5.2 Unconditional models
Table 2 reports the results from estimating random effects probit models for being a
“millionaire” and belonging to the top three percent. We report the average partial
effects (marginal effects) and the statistical significance of the underlying coeffi-
cient. Average partial effects are calculated as follows: per individual household,
we add a draw from the estimated random effects distribution to the linear predic-
tion, and then calculate an individual probability; we then average the probability
across many draws. The average partial effect is calculated as the derivative (or
difference in case of a discrete regressor) of that probability.
The models are estimated using two samples; all households and households
with an index person born 1940–1950.
19Appendix C reports estimations of conditional logit models and fixed effects dummy variables
logit models. The coefficient estimates are displayed in Table C.1 together with the coefficient esti-
mates of corresponding fixed effects dummy variables probit models. The conditional logit models
do not allow calculating predicted probabilities nor marginal effects and can only identify the coef-
ficients from a sample that ever becomes wealthy. The objective is to assess possible selectivity, in
particular the restriction that only households with 30 or more observations are included.
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Table 2: Random effects probit models, unconditional samples, average partial
effects
“millionaire” the top three percent
all the 1940s cohort all the 1940s cohort
age variables:
age 30 0.0008 0.0009 0.0009 0.0013
age 40 0.0019 0.0013 0.0017 0.0012
age 50 0.0029 0.0053 0.0022 0.0035
age 60 0.0040 0.0036 0.0024 0.0029
marital status, indicators:
cohabiting -0.0048∗∗∗ 0.0009 -0.0020 -0.0011
widow(er) -0.0196∗∗∗ -0.0172∗∗∗ -0.0203∗∗∗ -0.0158∗∗∗
divorced -0.0069∗∗∗ 0.0016 -0.0072∗∗∗ 0.0030
single -0.0124∗∗∗ -0.0156∗∗∗ -0.0127∗∗∗ -0.0098∗∗∗
unmarried × male 0.0040∗∗∗ 0.0005 0.0051∗∗∗ -0.0007
household variables:
number of children 6 or younger -0.0035∗∗ 0.0042 -0.0023 -0.0037
number of children 7–12 -0.0041∗∗∗ 0.0051∗ -0.0030∗∗ -0.0032
number of children 13–17 -0.0031∗ 0.0068∗∗ -0.0018 -0.0019
household size 0.0023∗∗∗ 0.0015∗∗∗ 0.0030∗∗∗ 0.0019∗∗∗
log employment income t−1 0.0066∗∗∗ 0.0007∗ 0.0083∗∗∗ 0.0010∗∗
income uncertainty:
transitory 0.0001∗∗∗ 0.0001∗∗∗ 0.0002∗∗∗ 0.0001∗∗∗
permanent 0.0010∗∗∗ 0.0009∗∗∗ 0.0010∗∗∗ 0.0010∗∗∗
macro variables:
real GDP growth, percent 0.0005∗∗∗ 0.0004∗∗ 0.0003∗∗∗ 0.0007∗∗∗
stock market index, 0.0025∗∗∗ 0.0013 -0.0023∗∗∗ -0.0008
percentage change
regional house price indices, -0.0126∗∗∗ -0.0197∗∗∗ -0.0044∗∗ -0.0233∗∗∗
percentage change
wealth tax variables:
bottom marginal tax rate t−1 -0.0142∗∗∗ -0.0157∗∗∗ -0.0013 0.0038
top marginal tax rate t−1 -0.0003 -0.0009 -0.0007∗∗ 0.0019∗∗∗
real exemption t−1, singles 0.0185∗∗∗ 0.0119∗∗∗ 0.0023∗∗ 0.0081∗∗∗
regional tax assessed house 0.0190∗∗∗ 0.0134∗∗∗ 0.0024∗∗∗ 0.0069∗∗∗
values, percentage change
tax exempt small businesses -0.0518∗∗∗ -0.0489∗∗∗ -0.0005 -0.0212∗∗∗
wealth, share
year variable:
post 1990, indicator 0.0227∗∗∗ 0.0154∗∗∗ -0.0053∗∗∗ 0.0014
time invariant variables,
index person, indicators:
male 0.0003 -0.0011 0.0002 -0.0011
primary education -0.0105∗∗∗ -0.0053∗ -0.0131∗∗∗ -0.0056∗∗
upper secondary education 0.0008 0.0053∗ -0.0014 0.0015
short tertiary education 0.0048∗∗ 0.0051 -0.0023 0.0018
long tertiary education 0.0081∗∗∗ 0.0138∗∗∗ 0.0048∗∗∗ 0.0107∗∗∗
postgraduate education 0.0315∗∗∗ 0.0351∗∗∗ 0.0217∗∗∗ 0.0262∗∗∗
other and missing education -0.0058∗∗∗ 0.0020 -0.0096∗∗∗ 0.0011
place of birth yes∗∗∗ yes∗∗∗ yes∗∗∗ yes∗∗∗
year of birth yes∗∗∗ yes yes∗∗∗ yes
n of observations 848,587 204,127 848,587 204,127
n of households 55,897 11,252 55,897 11,252
log likelihood -50,855 -10,546 -51.889 -10,986
pseudo R2 0.162 0.222 0.104 0.146
Notes: see Table 3.
Table 3: Notes to Tables
Table No. Notes
2, 4, 5, 6, 7 *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level,
respectively, of the underlying coefficient.
These, and associated standard errors available from the authors on request.
2, 4, 5, 6, 7 Reference categories for dummy variable groups:
married and lower secondary education
2, 4, 6 Random effects models also include as regressors
time-averages of time-varying variables.
2, 4, 6 Average partial effects for an extra year of age are based on a third degree
polynomial in age and an interaction of age and the number of non-adult children.
Effects are displayed at ages 30, 40, 50, and 60.
The age variables are jointly statistically significant according
to χ2-tests that in all cases yield a p-value of 0.000.
Average partial effects for an extra year of age are based on a third degree
polynomial in age and an interaction of age and the number of non-adult children.
We do not report the statistical significance of the underlying coefficients in the
tables for the age variables. The age variables are jointly statistically significant
in all reported estimations according to χ2-tests that in all cases yield a p-value of
0.000.
Being married increases the probability of being a “millionaire” and belonging
to the top three percent. Men living on their own are more likely to be wealthy
than women living on their own in the full sample. Household size is also associ-
ated with increased probabilities of being wealthy. The age distribution within the
household is not so important in the sample of the 1940s cohort. This is, however,
more the case for the other sample. Household employment income the previous
year also increases the probabilities.
Our estimates of the income uncertainty variables suggest that there are pre-
cautionary motives for wealth accumulation. All the estimated coefficients for the
income uncertainty variables are positive and statistically significant regardless of
sample or wealth definition. The average partial effects of permanent income un-
certainty are considerably larger than those of transitory income uncertainty. This
conforms with intuition (also compare Carroll and Samwick, 1997). The overall
effects are small, however. This suggests that precautionary accumulation does not
contribute to a large extent to becoming wealthy in our sense. Precautionary accu-
mulation may instead be confined to and be more important for those in the mid
deciles of the wealth distribution.
Looking at the χ2 values of joint significance tests, the macro variables are
more important for being a “millionaire” than belonging to the top three percent.
This suggest that these variables tend to affect absolute wealth but not relative
wealth.
A surprising result is the estimated negative impact of (regional) house prices
on the probability of being a “millionaire”. The estimated house price effect might,
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however, be affected by the inclusion of (regional) tax assessed house values.
The latter variable is associated with the expected increased probability of being
wealthy. The other wealth tax variables also have expected estimated effects in
most cases.
The more education for the index person, the higher the wealth probability is.
The place of birth indicators are jointly statistically significant, a χ2-test yields a p-
value of 0.000. Being born in the Stockholm area increases the wealth probability.
The year of birth is also (jointly) statistically significant for the sample with all
households.
The average partial age effects in the table are all positive. The largest effects
are for those aged 60 in the sample including all households. For those in the 1940s
cohort the largest estimated partial age effects is for those aged 50. This suggests
that there are life-cycle motives for wealth accumulation.
We have also calculated age-wealth probability profiles. This has been done in
the following way. The probability of being wealthy for each household in each
year has been predicted using the estimated coefficients, actual characteristics, and
draws from the estimated random effects distribution. This gives an age-wealth
probability for each household in each year. We finally calculate the average wealth
probability for each age.
Figure 6 and Figure 7 show the resulting age-wealth probability profiles for the
two samples. Starting with the sample with all households it is clear that the un-
conditional age-wealth probability profiles are increasing until the index person is
in the mid 60s. The maximum unconditional probability for being a “millionaire”
is for the age of 61. The corresponding age for maximum unconditional probabil-
ity of belonging to the top three percent is also 61. The maximum unconditional
wealth probability age for the 1940s cohort is 63 for both wealth definitions.20
The age-wealth probability pattern is consistent with the life-cycle model in the
sense that wealth first increases and then decreases. The peaks in the probability
of being wealthy occur at ages when retiring for most. This is consistent with life-
cycle motives for wealth accumulation. The wealth probability is positive even for
the very old. It is an open question why this is the case. It might be because of
precautionary motives or bequests motives.
5.3 Conditional models: all households
The samples used in this Subsection rely on estimating fixed effects as constants.
We want to be able to calculate individual probabilities and marginal effects of
being wealthy. While capturing all kinds of sources of household specific unob-
served heterogeneity, these constants are positively correlated with the probability
of being wealthy.
20There are few observations for the 1940s cohort when they are in their mid 60s. The only
observations we have of age 64 are in 2004 for those born in 1940. The only observations we have
of age 63 are in 2003 for those born in 1940 and in 2004 for those born in 1941. This might explain
why the probabilities do not increase continuously.
21
Figure 6: Unconditional age-wealth probability profiles, all
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Figure 7: Unconditional age-wealth probability profiles, the 1940s cohort
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Imposing the sample restriction that each household has to be in the data for at
least 30 years, will tend to select households whose index person is born in partic-
ular years, such that its data fall into our observation window 1968–2005. Younger
households, born for instance in the 1980’s, or older households that died before
the 1990’s, are unlikely to be included. While the fixed effects approach captures
the impact of cohort specific effects and allows them to be freely correlated with
all other included regressors, drawing such a sample will tend to exclude young
and old cohorts.
Appendix C further compares estimates obtained from varying the restriction
on the number of periods Ti per household. This appendix shows that the variation
in sample length is not very important for the estimated coefficients and that there
are only very small differences in coefficient estimates between a conditional logit
model, that we assume to be consistent, and the fixed effects (dummy variables)
estimates. These findings are reassuring, and underline that the marginal effects
displayed in our main tables are not driven by sample restrictions.
Columns 1 and 2 in Table 4 report the average partial effects (marginal effects)
from a fixed effects probit and a random effects probit for being a “millionaire”
conditional on having been a “millionaire” some time during the studied period.
The remaining columns report the average partial effects for belonging to the top
three percent conditional on having been in the top three percent some time during
the studied period. It is clear from the table that the random effects coefficient
estimates differ very little from the fixed effects coefficient estimates.
Being two adults in the household, rather than one, and being married increases
the probabilities of being a “millionaire” and belonging to the top three percent.
The estimated marital status indicators support this. So does the estimated effect
of household size while the number of minor children decreases the probability.
Men living on their own are more likely to be wealthy than women living on their
own. Household employment income also has an estimated positive impact.
The conditional models also suggest that there are (limited) precautionary mo-
tives for wealth accumulation. The estimated coefficients for the income uncer-
tainty variables are positive and statistically significant regardless of sample or
wealth definition. The relative weights of permanent and transitory income uncer-
tainty, however, differ here compared to the unconditional models.
The estimated effects of economic growth and changes in the stock market
index are expected. These variables are more important for being a “millionaire”
than belonging to the top three percent. This suggest that economic growth and
changes in the stock market index tend to affect absolute wealth more than relative
wealth. The wealth tax variables also have expected estimated effects.
The random effects estimation results in the second column reveal households
with male index persons are less likely to be “millionaires”. Moreover, only one
of the education indicators produce statistically significant result. A χ2-test of all
education variables taken together, however, produces a p-value of 0.000.
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Table 4: Probit models, conditional samples, average partial effects
“millionaire” the top three percent
fixed effects random effects fixed effects random effects
age variables:
age 30 0.0016 0.0010 0.0031 0.0031
age 40 0.0092 0.0093 0.0112 0.0120
age 50 0.0191 0.0200 0.0175 0.0190
age 60 0.0196 0.0201 0.0142 0.0148
marital status, indicators:
cohabiting -0.1087∗∗∗ -0.1100∗∗∗ -0.1219∗∗∗ -0.1261∗∗∗
widow(er) -0.1777∗∗∗ -0.2054∗∗∗ -0.1889∗∗∗ -0.2190∗∗∗
divorced -0.1369∗∗∗ -0.1300∗∗∗ -0.1469∗∗∗ -0.1401∗∗∗
single -0.1678∗∗∗ -0.1580∗∗∗ -0.1778∗∗∗ -0.1661∗∗∗
unmarried × male 0.0793∗∗∗ 0.0803∗∗∗ 0.0956∗∗∗ 0.0974∗∗∗
household variables:
number of children 6 or younger -0.0236∗∗∗ -0.0239∗∗∗ -0.0104 -0.0109
number of children 7–12 -0.0352∗∗∗ -0.0357∗∗∗ -0.0242∗∗∗ -0.0255∗∗∗
number of children 13–17 -0.0384∗∗∗ -0.0388∗∗∗ -0.0263∗∗∗ -0.0276∗∗∗
household size 0.0160∗∗∗ 0.0158∗∗∗ 0.0226∗∗∗ 0.0230∗∗∗
log employment income t−1 0.0413∗∗∗ 0.0423∗∗∗ 0.0658∗∗∗ 0.0694∗∗∗
income uncertainty:
transitory 0.0017∗∗∗ 0.0018∗∗∗ 0.0020∗∗∗ 0.0021∗∗∗
permanent 0.0022∗∗∗ 0.0017∗∗∗
macro variables:
real GDP growth, percent 0.0048∗∗∗ 0.0050∗∗∗ 0.0043∗∗∗ 0.0045∗∗∗
stock market index, 0.0494∗∗∗ 0.0512∗∗∗ 0.0080∗∗∗ 0.0083∗∗∗
percentage change
regional house price indices, -0.0616∗∗∗ -0.0644∗∗∗ -0.0102 -0.0116
percentage change
wealth tax variables:
bottom marginal tax rate t−1 -0.1320∗∗∗ -0.1371∗∗∗ -0.0009 -0.0008
top marginal tax rate t−1 -0.0085∗∗∗ -0.0090∗∗∗ -0.0054∗∗∗ -0.0057∗∗∗
real exemption t−1, singles 0.1436∗∗∗ 0.1495∗∗∗ 0.0184∗∗∗ 0.0194∗∗∗
regional tax assessed house 0.1665∗∗∗ 0.1725∗∗∗ 0.0381∗∗∗ 0.0397∗∗∗
values, percentage change
tax exempt small businesses -0.4753∗∗∗ -0.4950∗∗∗ -0.0209∗∗∗ -0.0229∗∗∗
wealth, share
year variable:
post 1990, indicator 0.1800∗∗∗ 0.1879∗∗∗ -0.0275∗∗∗ -0.0283∗∗∗
time invariant variables,
index person, indicators:
male -0.0114∗∗ -0.0080
primary education -0.0219∗∗∗ -0.0317∗∗∗
upper secondary education -0.0019 -0.0075
short tertiary education -0.0213∗ -0.0371∗∗∗
long tertiary education 0.0036 -0.0029
postgraduate education 0.0113 0.0072
other and missing education -0.0028 0.0036
place of birth yes∗∗∗ yes∗∗∗
year of birth yes∗ yes∗∗
n of observations 473,789 473,789 445,027 445,027
n of households 13,660 13,660 12,840 12,840
log likelihood -163,746 -186,202 -170,162 -191,816
pseudo R2 0.390 0.170 0.353 0.096
partial pseudo R2, regressors 0.144 0.078
partial pseudo R2, fixed effects 0.266 0.276
Notes: see Table 3.
A corresponding χ2-test of all indicators for place of birth indicators taken to-
gether also yields a p-value of 0.000. Having been born in northern Sweden, other
Nordic countries, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East reduces the probability of
being wealthy.
Turning to the fixed effects probit models we might ask: How much do the
fixed effects explain compared to the regressors? Table 4 reports partial pseudo R2
for regressors and fixed effects. It is clear from the table that the fixed effects are
very important.
The underlying estimated coefficients for the age variables are statistically sig-
nificant. The estimations suggest that there are life-cycle motives for wealth ac-
cumulation. The largest estimated partial age effects for being a “millionaire” are
for those aged 60. The estimated partial age effects for belonging to the top three
percent, on the other hand, are largest for those aged 50.
An important aspect of our fixed effects modeling approach is that it allows
gauging the importance of unobserved heterogeneity for the explained variation in
the data. Whereas the quite high overall pseudo R2 of 35 percent and more for
the fixed effects probits is both reassuring and little surprising, the partial pseudo
R2 for the fixed effects exceeds 26 percent in both models. This suggests that
unobserved individual heterogeneity is very important in determining wealth.21
Recall that these individual-specific dummy variables may account for a variety of
factors, ranging from cohort effects to preference parameters and entrepreneurial
skills. Remaining measured regressors contribute much less, depending on model
between 8 and 14 percent. Among those, we may distinguish between individual
observed heterogeneity (demographics and other taste shifters), on the one hand,
and aggregate macroeconomic or tax effects on the other hand. A closer inspection
of the size of the marginal effects, and the associated χ2 tests of joint significance,
reveals that macroeconomic and tax factors drive absolute wealth much more than
relative wealth.
We have calculated age-wealth probability profiles in the same way as for the
unconditional models. The random effects probit models provide the basis for the
presentation. Using the results from the fixed effects probit models produce almost
identical patterns.
The conditional age-wealth probability profile for being a “millionaire” is in-
creasing until the age 76, see the solid line in Figure 8. The dashed line in Figure 8
shows the conditional age-wealth probability profile for belonging to the top three
percent. The average probabilities are in this case higher for younger ages. The
peak is earlier, at the age of 67. Compared to the unconditional profile in Figure 6,
the later peak in Figure 8 is intuitive, given that the probability of being selected
21The overall pseudo R2 is based on a likelihood comparison of the probit model, including all
regressors and individual-specific dummy variables, with a probit model including only a single
constant. The partial pseudo R2 takes the difference between the overall pseudo R2 and either a probit
model with just regressors but no individual-specific dummies, or a probit model with individual
specific dummies and no further regressors. Both partial measures therefore do not add up to the
overall pseudo R2 measure.
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Figure 8: Conditional age-wealth probability profiles, all
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into the sample positively depends on age.
These age-wealth probability patterns are consistent with the life-cycle model
in the sense that wealth first increases and then decreases. The peak in wealth,
however, occurs when people are some years into retirement and not at the most
common retirement ages. The wealth probability is positive even for the very old
also here.
Time invariant regressors will, for obvious reasons, drop out of the fixed ef-
fects specification and be absorbed by the estimated fixed effects. The estimated
fixed effects capture heterogeneity. We will now turn to the correlates of our mea-
sured heterogeneity. We regress the estimated individual fixed effects on the time
invariant regressors. We use time-averaged values of the other regressors. The
estimations reported in Table 5 asks the questions what the correlates of the fixed
effects are.
The fixed effect is positively correlated with being single, divorced, and wid-
owed. It is negatively correlated with being an unmarried or a non-cohabiting man.
Average age is negatively associated with the fixed effect. There is a positive cor-
relation between the fixed effect and household size while the number of minors is
negatively associated with the fixed effect.
We include an indicator for ever reporting business income (or profits and
losses). Data are available from 1991 on. Personal wealth and self-employment
are strongly positively correlated. This is consistent with returns to entrepreneurial
abilities and risk taking. Liquidity constraints, that would likely cause an effect
in the same direction, are less likely at the heart of the explanation, given that we
study movements into the top of the distribution.
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Table 5: Correlates with fixed effects
“millionaire” top three percent
marital status, indicators, averages:
cohabiting 0.457 0.637∗
widow(er) 1.165∗∗∗ 1.171∗∗∗
divorced 0.834∗∗∗ 0.845∗∗∗
single 1.698∗∗∗ 1.794∗∗∗
unmarried × male -0.320∗∗∗ -0.391∗∗∗
household variables, averages:
age (in years) -0.044∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗
age × number of children -0.004 -0.005∗
number of children 6 or younger -0.210 -0.241
number of children 7–12 0.056 -0.054
number of children 13–17 -0.534∗∗ -0.571∗∗
household size 0.112∗ 0.171∗∗
log employment income t−1 1.094∗∗∗ 0.914∗∗∗
indicator ever had self-employment
income (post 1990) 0.260∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗∗
permanent income uncertainty 0.007∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
macro variables, averages:
real GDP growth, percent 0.072 -0.104
stock market index, -0.959 1.922
percentage changes
regional house price indices, 1.009 0.936
percentage changes
wealth tax variables, averages:
bottom marginal tax rate t−1 -3.374 -6.245
top marginal tax rate t−1 -0.908 -1.087
real exemption t−1, singles 2.145 1.463
regional tax assessed house values, -2.854∗∗ -1.301
percentage changes
tax exempt small businesses wealth, share 6.860∗∗ 4.520
year variable, average:
post 1990, indicator -3.993∗ -1.206
time invariant variables, index person:
male, indicator -0.055∗∗ -0.036
primary education, indicator -0.165∗∗∗ -0.185∗∗∗
upper secondary education, indicator -0.053 -0.063
short tertiary education, indicator -0.170∗∗ -0.218∗∗∗
long tertiary education, indicator -0.043 -0.044
postgraduate education, indicator -0.045 -0.038
other and missing education, indicator -0.078 -0.032
place of birth, indicators yes∗∗∗ yes∗∗∗
year of birth, indicators yes∗∗ yes∗∗∗
n of households/observations 13,660 12,840
adj R2 0.349 0.165
correlation with dep. variable 0.376 0.476
Notes: see Table 3.
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It is clear from the table that employment income is positively correlated with
the estimated fixed effect. There is a positive correlation between the permanent
income uncertainty and the fixed effect. The macro variables are not correlated
with the fixed effect.
The estimated correlations between the fixed effects and these measurable char-
acteristics predict a variance in fixed effects that corresponds to about a third of the
total variance of the fixed effects looking at the R2-measures for being a “million-
aire”. The R2-measures are lower for belonging to the top three percent.
5.4 Conditional models: the cohort born during the 1940s
We limit the sample to households with index persons born 1940–1950 in this
subsection. These household index persons were 18–28 years old in 1968 and
55–65 years old in 2005.
Table 6 reports the estimation results for the cohort born during the 1940s of
being a “millionaire” and belonging to the top three percent. Most estimated effects
do not differ qualitatively from those reported in Table 4. There are, however,
some important exceptions to this. The estimated effects of household size and the
number of minors are no longer statistically significant here.
These models also suggest that there are precautionary motives for wealth accu-
mulation. The estimated coefficients for permanent income uncertainty, however,
are not statistically significant here.
The bottom marginal tax rate has a statistically significant negative impact on
the probability of being a “millionaire”. The impact on belonging to the top three
percent is, on the other hand, positive and statistically significant. This suggests
that this tax rate affects absolute and relative wealth very differently.
The underlying estimated coefficients for the age variables are statistically sig-
nificant. The largest estimated partial age effects for being a “millionaire” and for
belonging to the top three percent are for those aged 50. For being a “millionaire”
this differs from the total sample where the largest estimated partial age effect, on
the other hand, is for those aged 60. These estimations also suggest that there are
life-cycle motives for wealth accumulation.
The calculated age-wealth probability profile is increasing over the whole age
range up to 64 years. This is clear from Figure 9. The solid line in the figure shows
the conditional probabilities, the maximum probability is 0.65. The maximum
probability is considerably higher for this cohort than for the total sample. The
dashed line in Figure 9 shows the age-wealth probability profile for being in the
top three percent. The maximum probability is 0.52.
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Table 6: Probit models, average partial effects, the 1940s cohort
“millionaire” the top three percent
fixed effects random effects fixed effects random effects
age variables:
age 30 0.0030 0.0036 0.0049 0.0047
age 40 0.0148 0.0129 0.0150 0.0164
age 50 0.0328 0.0332 0.0238 0.0246
age 60 0.0256 0.0240 0.0172 0.0157
marital status, indicators:
cohabiting -0.0485∗∗ -0.0490∗∗ -0.0688∗∗∗ -0.0706∗∗∗
widow(er) -0.1554∗∗∗ -0.1760∗∗∗ -0.1690∗∗∗ -0.1965∗∗∗
divorced -0.0798∗∗∗ -0.0710∗∗∗ -0.0684∗∗∗ -0.0633∗∗∗
single -0.1497∗∗∗ -0.1395∗∗∗ -0.1576∗∗∗ -0.1476∗∗∗
unmarried × male 0.0807∗∗∗ 0.0798∗∗∗ 0.0943∗∗∗ 0.0978∗∗∗
household variables:
number of children 6 or younger 0.0174 0.0201∗ -0.0060 -0.0038
number of children 7–12 0.0189 0.0217∗ -0.0076 -0.0055
number of children 13–17 0.0193 0.0221 -0.0074 -0.0051
household size -0.0004 -0.0012 0.0051∗∗ 0.0047∗
log employment income t−1 0.1243∗∗∗ 0.1224∗∗∗ 0.1411∗∗∗ 0.1453∗∗∗
income uncertainty:
transitory 0.0012∗∗∗ 0.0012∗∗∗ 0.0017∗∗∗ 0.0018∗∗∗
permanent 0.0009 0.0003
macro variables:
real GDP growth, percent 0.0013∗ 0.0014∗ 0.0054∗∗∗ 0.0057∗∗∗
stock market index, 0.0330∗∗∗ 0.0335∗∗∗ 0.0143∗∗ 0.0144∗∗
percentage change
regional house price indices, -0.1244∗∗∗ -0.1285∗∗∗ -0.1590∗∗∗ -0.1669∗∗∗
percentage change
wealth tax variables:
bottom marginal tax rate t−1 -0.0862∗∗∗ -0.0884∗∗∗ 0.0413∗∗∗ 0.0418∗∗∗
top marginal tax rate t−1 -0.0036 -0.0038 0.0133∗∗∗ 0.0136∗∗∗
real exemption t−1, singles 0.1007∗∗∗ 0.1046∗∗∗ 0.0624∗∗∗ 0.0662∗∗∗
regional tax assessed house 0.1124∗∗∗ 0.1148∗∗∗ 0.0589∗∗∗ 0.0614∗∗∗
values, percentage change
tax exempt small businesses -0.3138∗∗∗ -0.3226∗∗∗ -0.0795∗∗∗ -0.0872∗∗∗
wealth, share
year variable:
post 1990, indicator 0.0679∗∗∗ 0.0718∗∗∗ -0.0238∗∗ -0.0239∗∗
time invariant variables,
index person, indicators:
male -0.0114 -0.0148
primary education -0.0287∗∗ -0.0301∗∗
upper secondary education -0.0174 -0.0136
short tertiary education -0.0393∗∗∗ -0.0355∗
long tertiary education -0.0187 -0.0128
postgraduate education -0.0023 0.0074
other and missing education -0.0509 -0.0676
place of birth yes∗∗∗ yes∗∗∗
year of birth yes yes
n of observations 99,012 99,012 89,177 89,177
n of households 2,904 2,904 2,617 2,617
log likelihood -26,948 -31,464 -28,201 -32,346
pseudo R2 0.468 0.292 0.407 0.197
partial pseudo R2, regressors 0.264 0.171
partial pseudo R2, fixed effects 0.257 0.263
Notes: see Table 3.
Figure 9: Conditional age-wealth probability profiles, the 1940s cohort
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65
age, years
a v
e r
a g
e  
p r
o b
a b
i l i
t y millionaire
top three
Table 7 reports the correlates of the fixed effects, our measured heterogeneity.
Most estimated effects do not differ qualitatively from those reported in Table 5.
There are, however, two important exceptions to this: First, the estimated effect of
employment income is no longer statistically significant here. Second, permanent
income uncertainty is no longer significant here. It can also be noted that average
age and the year of birth indicators are not significant here when the sample is
constrained to only include households with index persons born in the 1940s.
The indicator for ever reporting business income (or profits and losses) is sta-
tistically significant also here. Personal wealth and self-employment are strongly
positively correlated.
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Table 7: Correlates with fixed effects, the 1940s cohort
“millionaire” top three percent
marital status, indicators, averages:
cohabiting 0.154 0.533
widow(er) 1.604∗∗∗ 1.564∗∗∗
divorced 0.400 0.690∗
single 1.878∗∗∗ 1.896∗∗∗
unmarried × male -0.362∗∗∗ -0.407∗∗∗
household variables, averages:
age (in years) 0.540 0.500
age × number of children 0.014 0.017
number of children 6 or younger -1.133∗ -1.153∗
number of children 7–12 -0.486 -1.458
number of children 13–17 -2.697∗∗∗ -2.338∗∗
household size 0.413∗∗∗ 0.465∗∗∗
log employment income t−1, average -0.043 -0.148
indicator ever had self-employment
income (post 1990) 0.206∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗∗
permanent income uncertainty 0.003 0.000
macro variables, averages:
real GDP growth, percent -0.319 -0.076
stock market index, 3.930 11.322∗∗
percentage changes
regional house price indices, -3.908 -3.527
percentage changes
wealth tax variables, averages:
bottom marginal tax rate t−1 -24.739∗∗ -23.455∗∗
top marginal tax rate t−1 2.846 2.709
real exemption t−1, singles -1.565 -2.442
regional tax assessed house values, -0.759 -0.694
percentage changes
tax exempt small businesses wealth, share 0.737 -1.485
year variable, average:
post 1990, indicator -1.272 1.755
time invariant variables, index person:
male, indicator -0.074 -0.078
primary education, indicator -0.200∗∗ -0.193∗∗
upper secondary education, indicator -0.167∗ -0.099
short tertiary education, indicator -0.271∗∗ -0.191
long tertiary education, indicator -0.138 -0.059
postgraduate education, indicator -0.092 -0.042
other and missing education, indicator -0.353 -0.395
place of birth, indicators yes∗∗∗ yes∗∗∗
year of birth, indicators yes yes
n of households/observations 2,904 2,617
adj R2 0.175 0.156
correlation with dep. variable 0.389 0.437
Notes: see Table 3.
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6 Conclusions
With increasing availability of suitable micro data, the recent economic literature
has seen a surge in interest in studying distributional issues and implications of
top incomes over the past few years. In addition, there is some revived interest in
studies on wealth mobility.
We add to this literature by studying individual wealth mobility over the entire
life cycle exploiting long individual time series of household wealth. We use a
large administrative sample from Sweden. The period under study covers the years
1968–2005. We can track many households that are continuously in the sample.
The wealth data are heavily censored from below. This is because their values
originate from wealth tax registers. The wealth tax in Sweden (repealed from 2007)
was associated with relatively high exemption levels. This leaves only a small
fraction (between 3.4 and 13.1 percent) of households observed with wealth in any
one cross section. We do, however, capture the top of the wealth distribution. This
is very important for determining wealth aggregates. A large fraction of households
pay wealth taxes at least at some point during their life cycles. 34 percent do so
if we condition on those that are in the sample every year from 1968 to 2005.
This is important as it makes it possible to study if the data are consistent with the
predictions from the life-cycle model.
Whereas the wealth information available in the tax data is restricted, we can
shed new light on the study of wealth mobility at the individual level. Due to
heavy censoring, we confine ourselves to looking at changes over time in binary
indicators. We, therefore, study movements in and out of the top three percent of
the wealth distribution and across an absolute wealth threshold that we refer to as
“millionaires”.
So, who is wealthy? Probably an individual in his 60s, married, living in a
big household and with more than twelve years of education. He was born in the
capital city region. The employment income of the household is high but variable.
The macroeconomic environment is characterized by economic growth, increasing
stock market prices, and increasing house values.
Our main results are:
• We find considerable movements into and within the top percents in the
wealth distribution. This is not quite consistent with previous results for
Sweden presented by Klevmarken (2004), but he studies other segments of
the wealth distribution than we do. The average duration in the top three
percents of the wealth distribution is about 6 years conditional on ever be-
longing to the top three percent.
• Intragenerational wealth mobility has varied over time. Our estimations sug-
gests that wealth mobility increased during the 1970s and 1980s in a relative
sense. The movements in the rankings in the top of the wealth distribution, in
other words, became more frequent. The peak in mobility coincides with the
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deregulation of the Swedish financial markets during the second half of the
1980s. Wealth mobility has decreased since then. The number of wealthy
and the concentration of wealth have increased at the same time.
• We find age-wealth probability patterns consistent with the life-cycle model
of savings and wealth accumulation. The patterns are consistent with the
life-cycle motives for savings in the sense that wealth first increases and then
decreases. The peak in the probability of being wealthy occurs when people
are about 65 years old. This is close to the age when retiring for most.
• The probability of being wealthy is higher when households experience high
income uncertainty. This is consistent with precautionary motives for sav-
ings and wealth accumulation, although effects are small.
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A Details on data
A.1 Samples
The data come in two sub-samples, the P- (panel) and the F-sample (family). For
the P-sample (1968–1999), an initial sample of 300,000 households (700,000 indi-
viduals) was drawn in 1994. A household in the data set is a group of people treated
as a taxable unit. For the vast majority of cases, this coincides with a residential
household or a family.
All members of these 1994 households were then followed through time, back-
wards until 1968, and assigned the same household number as the 1994 one if they
were members of that same tax household in the respective year. For those mem-
bers who joined the 1994 households in other years, a different household number
was assigned before joining. The data also tracks those joining members through
time when they are not member of a 1994 household. Likewise, the data were
extended beyond 1994 until 1999, using a similar sampling scheme. This implies
that the change in the number of households and individuals is closely following
the development of the entire residential population in the country for the period
1968–1999.
In the F-sample (from 1991 onwards) the sampling unit is a “family”: persons
living at the same address according to the population register. Since there may be
several sub-households within a “family” that are treated as separate taxable units,
and since members of the same tax households may live at different addresses, it
may be that the definitions of “households” in the P-sample and of “family” in
the F-sample do not coincide. A “family” is, on average, slightly larger than a
“household”.
Each household member included in the data has an individual identifier. Within
a household, one member is the designated index person. Usually, household and
person identifier coincide for this person. We can use this index person to link both
P- and F-samples over time.
We identify the head of household as the data index person. The definition
changes between P- and F-samples. In 1999, identifiers for household/family are
the same, but the correspondence in 1991–1998 between the household/family
identifiers is not perfect.
The index person in the F-files corresponds (with very few exceptions) to the
oldest member in the household, while the index person in the P-files corresponds
to the oldest male in the the household (except for women-only households, and a
few other cases).
Hence, we recompute the household identifier (hhid) for the P-files based on
the oldest member and assign as index person (head of household) the one whose
person identifier is equal to hhid, if aged 18 and above.
Especially in the 1980’s there are a small number of households without head
(children-only households); if these cannot be matched successfully, we do not
assign a head of household; if they can, we attribute a person that is recorded in the
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household in other years.
We further identify personal characteristics of the household by those of the
index person (age, sex, education, etc.).
A.2 A short account of imputations
The original LINDA files come with a number of variables from various registers
requiring integration into consistent time series for our purposes. The following
very briefly lists some of the main imputations and checks performed on the data.
• Region of Birth and Residence:
Over the years, various labels have been used for country (residents born
abroad) or county (Swedish-born residents) of birth. County boundaries have
changed.
In a few years, county of residence is unavailable. We can use census in-
formation for 1970, and we can rely on information from other variables for
other years, such as the local tax authority code, to determine the county of
residence in a given year. Between years, we impute missings from adjacent
years.
For those born abroad, we distinguish the following regions of birth: Scandi-
navia, other Western Europe, Eastern Europe (inc. former USSR), the Mid-
dle East, and the rest of the world. In a very small amount of cases changes
of origin of birth are recorded in the data. We use the latest information on
record to impute missings and inconsistencies, after aggregation into broad
categories.
• Tax units:
To understand the accuracy of wealth information available in the data, we
can use the tax schedule to impute taxes paid from wealth reported. We can
then compare the imputed tax liability with the actual taxes paid reported
in the data. However, the taxes paid will depend on the tax unit within the
household, so that we first need to determine which members form a tax unit
within a household in a particular year.
Assessment: with a tolerance of SEK 100, we calculate the correct tax
amounts (if positive) in about 97 percent of all cases. This suggests that
the tax units are largely correctly identified. The share of households with
correct tax amounts varies between years, from a low of 94.84 percent (2002)
to a high of 99.36 percent (1974).
Figure A.1 shows how wealth tax revenue calculated using the households
in the LINDA samples corresponds to total wealth tax revenue reported by
the Swedish National Financial Management Authority. It is clear from the
figure that tax revenue according to the micro data tracks total tax revenue
surprisingly well.
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Figure A.1: Wealth tax revenue: Actual and calculated from the LINDA samples
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• Education:
In LINDA, education is available only from 1990 on, at different levels of
recording/aggregation and completeness. In 1990 there is an indicator from 1
to 7 for different levels, in 1991–1999 there is a 5-digit code, recording both
education type and vocational orientation, in 2000–2005 there is a 3-digit
code. Coding referred to the SUN system for years before 2000, and to
SUN2000 from year 2000 onwards. We adjusted all education levels to the
six classes defined in SUN2000 for all years. This also holds for education
levels determined in 1970, for which we use separately available census data.
There are, thus, two problem areas for education information in our data:
one is the large gap between 1971 and 1989. The other is inconsistencies in
the time series, among which larger than expected jumps between records
from adjacent years, and decreasing education levels between years.
We want to impose on the data that education is weakly monotonically in-
creasing in age for each individual. We impute incomplete individual histo-
ries, making simplifying assumptions, and use—where available—information
on the year of attainment of a particular level. The following table gives the
education coding according to the SUN2000 system,
level SUN 2000, corresponds to ISCED 97 we use the term max. age
0 pre-primary education pre-school education
1 primary and lower secondary education, primary education 15
less than 9 years
2 primary and lower secondary education, lower secondary education 16
9 (or 10) years
3 upper secondary education upper secondary education 18
4 post-secondary education, short tertiary education 22
less than two years
5 post-secondary education, long tertiary education 27
two years or longer
6 postgraduate education postgraduate education 32
where level 0 is never recorded in the data. The column ‘max. age’ indicates
the age threshold beyond which we assume no change of education level
anymore, unless found explicitly in the data.
The imputation then proceeds as follows: In a first step, all those that need
special attention (those where education level drops with age and those whose
education level jumps particularly strongly) were identified, and separated
from those that only had incomplete series.
In a second step, all individuals were identified who had no education infor-
mation whatsoever. For these, a pure age imputation has been done for levels
0 and 1.
For others, we make a distinction according to whether the year of attaining
the reported education level is available. If so, we use backward updating
of levels until the earliest reported year: starting in 2005, we attribute the
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education level reported in that year to all years backwards until the year of
attainment. We then go back, year by year, to update missing information.
Those that do not have any information on the year of educational attainment,
or those who after using the year information still had incomplete histories,
have been imputed on an age/max. education level basis. Here, we interpret
more recent information as being more accurate. Particular problems were
encountered for some observations in 1970 and 1990, that we first set to
missing before imputing.
In a third step, we deal–in a similar way–with problematic cases (sudden
jumps and negative education level changes). Again, observations in 1970
and 1990 were associated with many of the problematic cases and were set
to missing before being imputed.
In a fourth step, we combine all the information and imputed values from
before.
Overall, some 19 million person-year observations were missing in the orig-
inal data, of which close to 17 million have been imputed. Only a small
number of observations (less than 0.5 percent of the data) have their original
values changed or set to missing due to inconsistencies. About 9 percent of
all observations keep a missing value that could not be imputed.
• Number of Children:
Large differences in the overall number of children recorded per household
can arise between the years. This is particularly true for P-files, and to lesser
extent for F-files. Children without any wealth of their own do not pose
a problem for our household wealth measures, but the number of children
below 18, used as a regressor, varies.
No attempt has been undertaken to impute the number of children age 18
and above per household, and we do not use such information.
The imputation makes the following assumptions: (1) all children ever re-
ported have been, after they were born, present in some sampled household
at some stage, and (2) children aged 17 or younger that cease to be reported
continue to be in the household they were last observed until they turn 18; in
particular, no child dies.
Assumption (1) may introduce errors (overcounts) for children that were (a)
step-children, adopted or foster-children entering the household at age>0, or
(b) left the household temporarily with one of the parents, say. Assumption
(1) also applies to dealing with observational gaps:
Suppose a child is observed in 1971 and before, not observed in 1972–1975
and observed in 1976–1980. If it is observed in 1971 and 1976 in the same
household, it is attributed to that household also during the gap years. If
it is observed in a different household, we assume it belongs to the 1976-
household from 1972 on.
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Assumption (2) is possibly more problematic as a child might leave the
household due to (a) death, (b) school elsewhere, and (c) the household split-
ting. Of those reasons, only (c) may be of practical relevance.
Imputations (1) and (2) misattribute children status to below-age-18 non-
children household members. Presumably this is a minor issue.
Assessment: the distribution of the number of children in different age classes
looks a lot smoother over time after the imputation than before the imputa-
tion. The total number of children added this way is larger during early years
(1968–1970) than during later years, and totals about 5 percent for the P-files
and 2 percent for the F-files.
A.3 Income uncertainty
We attempt to disentangle the permanent from the transitory variance of earnings.
In a first step, we split the data by education level j and regress transformed non-
capital income (a measure of earnings before taxes, but including benefits, etc.)
on aggregate productivity growth g and an individual-specific linear age (or time)
trend. That is, the model we estimate is
y˜it = gtγ j +aitαi+ηi+ εit ∀ j.
where y˜it is the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation applied to our income mea-
sure yit . This transformation is similar to a logarithm, but allows for non-positive
incomes. ait denotes age, εit is an idiosyncratic shock, and ηi is a fixed individual-
specific constant. αi is likewise an estimated, fixed individual-specific parameter.
This way of modeling allows each household to have their own age-income pro-
file, and hence allows for a large degree of heterogeneity in the population. We,
thus, do not specify global income processes, but rather rely on within-household
identification. We assume that conditional on the fixed effect and general income
growth (we use real GDP growth for gt), the individual household knows about its
parameter αi and, therefore, can predict mean income from age. Note that the fixed
effect formulation allows implicitly for all kinds of correlations with unobserved
fixed factors.
In a second step, we determine the residual rˆit as the difference between the
observed and the predicted value of income, ˆ˜yit = gt γˆ j+ait αˆi+ ηˆi. The variance of
permanent income uncertainty is then captured by the within-household variance
of rˆit , and the variance of transitory income shocks is calculated on 3 adjacent
within-household observations of rˆit , and, therefore, varies over time.
The procedure we use is an alternative to the well-known approach advocated
by Carroll and Samwick (1997). These authors first postulate a process for log
permanent income (random walk with drift), and then back out the permanent
and transitory variances from a number of time-differences of income given the
model. Applied to our data, this procedure results not only in negative estimates of
transitory variances, but also in almost perfect correlation between permanent and
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transitory variance estimates in the cross section. Note that we use similar income
measures as Carroll and Samwick (1997), but base our estimates on longer time
series (38 years as opposed to 7).
A.4 Descriptive regressions
The nonlinear trend imposed on Figure 4 is obtained from the regression displayed
in Table A.1, column 1. The adjusted series and the trends in Figure 5 are the
regressions presented in column 2–4 in Table A.1.
Table A.1: Descriptive regressions
percentage share remaining in:
dependent variable: Shorrocks’ the top
measure P97–P98 P98–P99 percent
trend 0.0147∗∗∗ -1.66∗∗∗ -1.61∗∗∗ -1.12∗∗∗
(0.0029) (0.39) (0.30) (0.20)
trend2/10 -0.00347∗∗∗ 0.386∗∗∗ 0.379∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗
(0.00075) (0.104) (0.080) (0.053)
change in assessment of single 0.00669∗∗∗ -0.819∗∗∗ -0.828∗∗∗ -0.346∗∗∗
family houses’ tax values (0.00095) (0.131) (0.100) (0.066)
change in small businesses’ -0.00420∗∗∗ 0.533∗∗∗ 0.459∗∗∗ 0.261∗∗∗
wealth tax values (0.00091) (0.125) (0.096) (0.064)
change in exemption difference 0.148∗∗ -34.2∗∗∗ -5.45 -4.46
between couples and singles (0.056) (7.74) (5.93) (3.94)
constant 0.217∗∗∗ 65.1∗∗∗ 77.4∗∗∗ 92.8∗∗∗
(0.024) (3.30) (2.53) (1.68)
F(5,31) 19.26 17.98 22.78 14.16
prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.756 0.744 0.786 0.695
adj R2 0.717 0.702 0.752 0.646
RMSE 0.0427 5.891 4.514 2.997
number of observations 37 37 37 37
Notes. Standard errors within parentheses.
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1 percent level.
** denotes statistical significance at the 5 percent level.
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B The Swedish wealth tax
The Swedish wealth tax in its modern form was introduced in 1948 when there
was an extensive tax reform. It has never been a major source of government
revenue. The main arguments for it have been equity and redistribution. The wealth
tax was repealed from 2007 by the then newly elected right-wing government.22
The tax remains a hot political topic, the Social Democrats said that they would
reintroduce the tax if they regained power in the 2010 parliamentary election. The
Social Democrats, however, lost the election.
The main features of the wealth tax were unchanged over the main observation
period, 1968–2005. It differed from other personal taxes in that it was levied at the
household level and not at the individual level. This was, in other words, the only
example when the household, and not the individual or the firm, was the unit of
taxation.23
The net wealth of the adult members of the household was added together with
the net wealth of the minor children of the household. The tax base was a compre-
hensive measure of household net wealth (including real assets and financial assets
minus debts).24 Household tax liability was subsequently individualized according
to the net wealth share of the individual within the household.
Taxable wealth did not include pension wealth in the sense that the value of
future public and occupational pensions were not included, neither were savings
in tax deferred pension savings accounts. The values of cars, boats, works of art,
and life insurance were not included. In addition, there was far from complete
coverage of assets abroad. The tax base primarily consisted of assets for which it
was possible to get third party reporting from banks, financial institutions, public
agencies, etc.
The wealth tax system was conceptually simple. There was a generous exemp-
tion level, exempting, on average, more than 90–95 percent of all households from
paying any taxes at all. We refer to this as tax bracket zero with a marginal tax rate
of zero. As of 2001, households with two adult spouses got a higher exemption
than single households.
Subsequently, (progressively) positive marginal tax rates were applied to sub-
sequent brackets. In later years, the system was simplified to a two-bracket system
with a zero-marginal rate in bracket zero and a single positive marginal tax rate
thereafter. Tax reforms were discontinuous but frequent and marginal. In every
few years bracket limits have been adjusted, marginal rates have been changed, or
the number of tax brackets has been varied. In addition, in all years between nom-
22The Swedish repeal of the wealth tax followed similar repeals in Austria (from 2001), Denmark
(from 1997), Finland (from 2006), and Italy (from 2005).
23The personal income tax was joint between spouses before 1971. From 1966 couples could,
however, apply to be treated as single filers, see Selin (2009).
24The owner to the international clothing retail company H&M threatened to leave the country in
1990s. The government, therefore, introduced some new valuation principles that in practice meant
that a handful superrich basically became tax exempt.
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inal changes, the real value of the exemption threshold was affected by inflation
(fiscal drag).
Table B.1 reports the main aspects of the Swedish wealth tax exemptions and
rates during the period 1948–2006.
Table B.2 presents the number and the share of households in the LINDA data
set paying the wealth tax each year. The mean wealth of these households is also
reported. The number and the share of households classified as “millionaires” are
also given in the table in an analogous way. The table also presents the mean wealth
of the “millionaires”. The table finally lists the number of households in the top
three percent of the wealth distribution and their mean wealth.
45
Ta
bl
e
B
.1
:W
ea
lth
ta
x
ra
te
s,
19
48
–2
00
6.
fr
om
:
fr
om
:
ex
em
pt
io
n,
N
et
w
ea
lth
as
se
ss
m
en
t
SE
K
1,
00
0
la
w
D
ec
31
ye
ar
si
ng
le
s
co
up
le
s
n
of
br
ac
ke
ts
to
p
ra
te
,%
so
ur
ce
19
47
C
G
W
L
19
48
19
49
30
5
1.
8
SS
B
19
47
:5
77
19
53
19
54
50
6
1.
8
SS
B
19
47
:5
77
,S
SB
19
52
:4
07
19
57
19
58
10
0
6
1.
8
SS
B
19
47
:5
77
,S
SB
19
57
:1
06
19
66
19
67
10
0
5
1.
8
SS
B
19
47
:5
77
,S
SB
19
65
:7
3
19
71
19
72
15
0
4
2.
5
SS
B
19
47
:5
77
,S
SB
19
70
:1
70
19
74
19
75
20
0
4
2.
5
SS
B
19
47
:5
77
,S
SB
19
74
:3
11
19
81
19
82
40
0
4
2.
5
SS
B
19
47
:5
77
,S
SB
19
80
:1
05
5
19
83
19
84
40
0
4
3
SS
B
19
47
:5
77
,S
SB
19
82
:1
19
0
19
83
T
C
G
W
L
19
83
on
ly
19
84
on
ly
30
0
5
4
SS
B
19
83
:9
68
19
85
19
86
40
0
4
3
SS
B
19
47
:5
77
,S
SB
19
84
:1
08
0
19
90
19
91
80
0
3
3
SS
B
19
47
:5
77
,S
SB
19
89
:1
02
6
19
91
19
92
80
0
2
2.
5
SS
B
19
47
:5
77
,S
SB
19
91
:4
16
19
92
19
93
80
0
1
1.
5
SS
B
19
47
:5
77
,S
SB
19
92
:1
48
9
19
96
19
97
90
0
1
1.
5
SS
B
19
47
:5
77
,S
SB
19
96
:6
90
19
97
C
G
W
L
19
97
19
98
90
0
1
1.
5
SS
B
19
97
:3
23
20
01
20
02
1,
00
0
1,
50
0
1
1.
5
SS
B
19
97
:3
23
,S
SB
20
00
:1
42
2
20
02
20
03
1,
50
0
2,
00
0
1
1.
5
SS
B
19
97
:3
23
,S
SB
20
01
:8
36
20
05
20
06
1,
50
0
3,
00
0
1
1.
5
SS
B
19
97
:3
23
,S
SB
20
04
:1
03
9
re
pe
al
20
07
20
08
SS
B
19
97
:3
23
,S
SB
20
07
:1
40
3
N
ot
es
.C
G
W
L
is
C
en
tr
al
G
ov
er
nm
en
tW
ea
lth
Ta
x
L
aw
,T
C
G
W
L
is
Te
m
po
ra
ry
C
en
tr
al
G
ov
er
nm
en
tW
ea
lth
Ta
x
L
aw
,
SS
B
(S
F
S)
is
Sw
ed
is
h
St
at
ut
e
B
oo
k
46
Ta
bl
e
B
.2
:C
on
di
tio
na
lm
ea
n
w
ea
lth
,1
96
8–
20
05
,c
ur
re
nt
SE
K
1,
00
0.
al
l
pa
y
ta
x
“m
ill
io
na
ir
e”
to
p
3
pe
rc
en
t
to
p
1
pe
rc
en
t
co
nd
iti
on
al
“m
ill
io
na
ir
e”
co
nd
iti
on
al
co
nd
iti
on
al
co
nd
iti
on
al
ye
ar
no
bs
ex
em
pt
io
n
no
bs
sh
ar
e
m
ea
n
w
ea
lth
th
re
sh
ol
d
no
bs
sh
ar
e
m
ea
n
w
ea
lth
no
bs
m
ea
n
w
ea
lth
no
bs
m
ea
n
w
ea
lth
19
68
26
1,
10
2
10
0
16
,0
91
6.
16
25
4
12
5
11
,3
81
4.
36
31
3
7,
83
3
39
1
2,
61
1
75
8
19
69
26
7,
91
2
10
0
17
,1
87
6.
42
25
5
13
5
10
,7
81
4.
02
33
8
8,
03
7
40
3
2,
67
9
78
6
19
70
27
0,
25
9
15
0
11
,1
68
4.
13
34
0
15
0
11
,1
68
4.
13
34
0
8,
10
7
40
6
2,
70
2
75
3
19
71
26
8,
12
9
15
0
13
,6
68
5.
10
33
2
16
1
12
,0
09
4.
48
35
9
8,
04
3
44
7
2,
68
1
82
5
19
72
26
8,
10
3
15
0
14
,7
22
5.
49
33
6
17
6
11
,0
60
4.
13
39
6
8,
04
3
47
2
2,
68
1
87
6
19
73
26
8,
82
0
15
0
15
,6
17
5.
81
34
0
19
5
9,
89
7
3.
68
44
1
8,
06
4
49
4
2,
68
8
92
7
19
74
27
0,
55
4
20
0
9,
51
3
3.
52
45
4
22
0
7,
89
3
2.
92
50
5
8,
11
6
49
7
2,
70
5
94
2
19
75
27
2,
73
9
20
0
15
,1
77
5.
56
43
7
25
7
9,
61
2
3.
52
56
1
8,
18
2
61
2
2,
72
7
1,
13
4
19
76
27
3,
44
6
20
0
15
,9
88
5.
85
43
1
29
0
7,
89
2
2.
89
63
0
8,
20
3
61
7
2,
73
4
1,
14
1
19
77
27
4,
64
3
20
0
16
,5
91
6.
04
40
1
31
4
6,
77
0
2.
47
63
0
8,
23
9
57
1
2,
74
6
1,
00
5
19
78
27
2,
65
1
20
0
13
,9
02
5.
10
45
3
34
9
4,
49
1
1.
65
86
3
8,
17
9
61
0
2,
72
6
1,
17
2
19
79
27
4,
01
6
20
0
14
,7
12
5.
37
41
2
39
0
3,
61
3
1.
32
85
5
8,
22
5
55
5
2,
74
0
99
6
19
80
27
4,
77
4
20
0
16
,3
98
5.
97
42
8
44
3
3,
14
8
1.
15
1,
04
1
8,
24
8
61
4
2,
74
9
1,
12
6
19
81
27
5,
17
3
40
0
12
,2
17
4.
44
74
8
48
3
8,
04
1
2.
92
91
4
8,
26
0
90
2
2,
75
2
1,
56
4
19
82
27
5,
15
1
40
0
13
,8
10
5.
02
76
9
52
8
7,
36
7
2.
68
1,
04
8
8,
25
5
99
0
2,
75
1
1,
75
4
19
83
27
3,
83
2
30
0
28
,3
61
10
.3
6
64
6
59
2
6,
56
5
2.
40
1,
44
6
8,
21
5
1,
26
9
2,
73
8
2,
49
0
19
84
27
5,
62
8
40
0
16
,6
55
6.
04
79
1
66
4
4,
96
1
1.
80
1,
48
2
8,
27
1
1,
12
8
2,
75
6
2,
07
8
19
85
27
6,
47
1
40
0
19
,1
89
6.
94
80
4
72
2
4,
89
0
1.
77
1,
64
9
8,
29
9
1,
23
6
2,
76
4
2,
29
7
19
86
27
7,
34
1
40
0
23
,8
21
8.
59
85
5
78
9
5,
49
8
1.
98
1,
91
2
8,
32
2
1,
50
8
2,
77
3
2,
89
8
19
87
27
8,
28
8
40
0
23
,4
80
8.
44
80
6
85
3
4,
10
6
1.
48
2,
00
6
8,
35
0
1,
35
9
2,
78
2
2,
52
3
19
88
28
1,
17
8
40
0
27
,5
74
9.
81
88
7
92
7
4,
74
8
1.
69
2,
41
1
8,
43
9
1,
71
2
2,
81
1
3,
36
0
19
89
28
2,
12
7
40
0
30
,2
71
10
.7
3
91
4
1,
02
2
4,
64
0
1.
64
2,
67
1
8,
46
6
1,
86
3
2,
82
2
3,
65
9
19
90
28
5,
27
2
80
0
12
,4
69
4.
37
1,
58
3
1,
11
3
5,
90
8
2.
07
2,
31
1
8,
55
8
1,
91
4
2,
85
2
3,
42
6
19
91
28
4,
97
5
80
0
14
,4
93
5.
09
1,
56
7
1,
19
2
6,
45
9
2.
27
2,
34
5
8,
54
9
2,
04
6
2,
84
9
3,
57
3
19
92
28
6,
74
5
80
0
16
,7
40
5.
84
1,
52
5
1,
18
2
7,
26
3
2.
53
2,
29
6
8,
60
3
2,
11
6
2,
86
7
3,
68
3
19
93
28
8,
80
1
80
0
19
,6
98
6.
82
1,
59
1
1,
18
8
9,
09
9
3.
15
2,
34
5
8,
66
6
2,
40
2
2,
88
8
4,
23
3
19
94
29
1,
09
5
80
0
16
,1
16
5.
54
1,
83
7
1,
25
9
7,
41
8
2.
55
2,
84
3
8,
73
2
2,
59
7
2,
91
0
4,
86
6
19
95
29
2,
11
7
80
0
17
,3
14
5.
93
1,
85
6
1,
35
0
7,
34
0
2.
51
2,
99
3
8,
76
3
2,
71
7
2,
92
1
5,
02
4
19
96
29
7,
24
9
90
0
19
,2
08
6.
46
2,
23
3
1,
37
9
10
,7
04
3.
60
3,
13
4
8,
91
7
3,
47
2
2,
97
2
6,
50
6
19
97
29
8,
00
8
90
0
23
,1
79
7.
78
2,
01
4
1,
43
4
10
,8
20
3.
63
3,
05
1
8,
94
0
3,
37
6
2,
98
0
6,
10
4
19
98
29
8,
51
0
90
0
24
,6
04
8.
24
2,
05
9
1,
49
7
10
,9
02
3.
65
3,
22
7
8,
95
5
3,
58
7
2,
98
5
6,
52
4
19
99
29
3,
19
0
90
0
27
,7
04
9.
45
2,
34
3
1,
57
9
12
,8
46
4.
38
3,
69
8
8,
79
5
4,
59
0
2,
93
1
8,
57
0
20
00
30
0,
37
9
90
0
27
,3
42
9.
10
2,
33
7
1,
67
0
11
,1
69
3.
72
3,
99
7
9,
01
1
4,
52
9
3,
00
3
8,
62
2
20
01
30
1,
56
4
1,
00
0
18
,8
30
6.
24
2,
99
0
1,
72
2
12
,8
91
4.
27
3,
71
8
9,
04
6
4,
49
4
3,
01
5
8,
11
5
20
02
30
3,
31
5
1,
50
0
10
,5
99
3.
49
3,
73
6
1,
78
6
11
,3
93
3.
76
3,
64
2
9,
09
9
4,
08
0
3,
03
3
7,
14
1
20
03
30
5,
38
4
1,
50
0
13
,0
90
4.
29
3,
74
2
1,
84
8
12
,4
54
4.
08
3,
87
5
9,
16
1
4,
52
9
3,
05
3
7,
97
9
20
04
30
7,
44
1
1,
50
0
13
,5
86
4.
42
3,
80
9
1,
92
2
12
,3
55
4.
02
4,
03
9
9,
22
3
4,
69
7
3,
07
4
8,
35
0
20
05
30
8,
50
6
1,
50
0
9,
21
8
2.
99
4,
79
9
1,
99
4
8,
44
9
2.
74
5,
19
9
9,
25
5
4,
91
0
3,
08
5
8,
99
1
47
C Comparison with logit models
This appendix presents additional auxiliary results. These results are useful to
establish whether our sample selection for the conditional samples (in particular the
restrictions that both Ti ≥ 30, and that there be variation in the dependent variable
over time for a given individual household) employed in Tables 4 and 6 leads to
any biases. We illustrate this for the absolute threshold (“millionaires”). Results
for the top three percent sample are similar.
Recall that to be able to calculate average partial effects for the fixed effects
models, we need to rely on estimators that do not condition out the fixed effects, but
rather allow estimating them. Estimation by way of dummy variable approaches is
a viable route to do so, if the time series at the individual level are long enough.25
While the restriction Ti ≥ 30 is arbitrary, we can compare the coefficient estimates
we obtain with those from a conditional logit model. The latter only imposes mild
restrictions on the required length of the time series (Ti ≥ 2). We can estimate
dummy-variable binary choice models under a logit and under a probit functional
form assumption, maximizing a standard likelihood function (see Greene, 2004,
for details on implementation).
The functional form differences between logit and probit in themselves give
rise to different coefficient estimates because of differences in scale that we correct
for in the Table displayed below. Otherwise, we expect logit and probit dummy
variable estimates to be close to each other, and close to the conditional logit esti-
mates.
Indeed, as Table C.1 shows, for each sample restriction, Ti ≥ 30, Ti ≥ 20, or
Ti ≥ 2, we find coefficient estimates from the different models that are very simi-
lar to each other. Whereas this finding is very reassuring for the case Ti ≥ 30, the
comparison at Ti ≥ 2 is also very favorable to the fixed effects dummies probit es-
timator. Simulation assessments exist in the literature to gauge the size of potential
biases of the dummy-variables approach. Our comparison using actual data sug-
gests that the biases on coefficient estimates are minor, however, even for Ti ≥ 2,
and assuming the conditional logit estimates are always consistent.
The comparison across samples, as we go down from Ti ≥ 30 to Ti ≥ 2, is a
little less favorable, but even here we find that the large majority of coefficient
estimates is not very much affected by variation in sample size. Perhaps one of
the largest differences concerns the coefficients on age polynomials that are very
important to our study. However, plotting the implied age profiles shows that there
is mainly a level shift implied between all models, not a noticeable difference in
shape or curvature.
The very last column in Table C.1 also displays the coefficient estimates un-
derlying the first column in Table 2, where we also lift the restriction that there be
any change in the dependent variable for a given individual. With the exception
25Else, we might face an incidental parameters problem, see Neyman and Scott (1948) and Greene
(2004).
48
of a few demographics, the estimates are quite similar to those in the next-to-last
column that still does impose such a restriction.
Remaining differences in coefficient estimates between sample-lengths can be
explained by households that are observed for a longer time period having a higher
probability of being observed at least once to be wealthy than those observed for
shorter periods. This observability is slightly correlated with some of our observ-
ables (for instance the number of children at different ages). The difference are not
due to self -selection (agent’s choice), however.
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